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Abstract. Saving brings an economic loss. The author intends to publish a paper, which 
gives a foundation of this paradox of thrift by connecting money circulation analysis and 
welfare economics in the case where saving is limited to hoarding. As an introduction of 
the intended paper, this paper provides a simple explanation for hoarding loss using some 
graphs. Under certain conditions, the representative agent hoards money in order to 
increase utility, but the hoarding actually decreases it against agent’s rational intention. 
This irrationality of rationality occurs because the agent maximizes their utility while 
lowering the budget of the entire relevant term. This conclusion is derived from the agent 
making the decision with an ignorance of the whole expenditure reflux. Since the interest of 
a selfish agent is limited to their private range, the agent ignores the reflux despite of its 
objective truthfulness. 
Keywords. Money circulation, Welfare economics, Under-consumption, Paradox of thrift, 
Intertemporal choice. 
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1. Introduction 
aving brings an economic loss even though it is often regarded as a virtue. 
This proposition, known as the paradox of thrift, is one of main elements of 
the under-consumption theory, which has been known since the early 
nineteenth century (Haberler, 1964; Klein, 1966; Nash & Gramm, 1969; Bleaney, 
1976; Dimand, 1991; Allgoewer, 2002; Clark, 2008; Schneider, 2008). 
Before the Second World War, studies to understand the causes of under-
consumption while connecting it with the money circulation structure were 
performed by some economists including Nicholas August Ludwig Jacob 
Johannsen (Hegeland, 1954; Schneider, 1962; Marget, 1964; Allsbrock, 1986; 
Hagemann & Rühl, 1990; Rühl, 2000), the pair of William Trufant Foster and 
Waddill Catchings (Gleason, 1959; Carlson, 1962; Tavlas, 1976; Dimand, 2008a; 
Dimand, 2008b),
1
 and two German economists, Ferdinand Grünig and Carl Föhl 
(Pedersen, 1954; Pedersen, 1957; Schneider, 1962; Rothschild, 1964; Ambrosi, 
1996).
2
 
We support such attempts, but they lack a clear evaluation criterion even though 
under-consumption is an ethical problem of economic society. We introduce an 
evaluation criterion based on individual utility, imitating the new welfare 
economics after Vilfredo Pareto. 
New welfare economics has usually been connected with the general 
equilibrium theory. This connection derives the first fundamental theorem of 
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welfare economics, which insists that a market economy is realized as a Pareto 
efficient state (Arrow, 1951; Debreu, 1959; Stiglitz, 1991; Blaug, 2007; Feldman, 
2008). We should not neglect a critique against the general equilibrium theory. 
The dual decision hypothesis by Robert Wayne Clower is remarkable as one 
such critique (Clower, 1965). It implies that realized revenue used in expenditure 
optimization should not be regarded as being decided by the level of commodity 
supply. Although this is a valid critique of the general equilibrium theory, its weak 
point is that it does not clarify the decision principle of the realized revenue in lieu 
of commodity supply. 
In a monetary economy, realized revenue is decided by money flow from 
expenditure, whereas expenditure is affected by money flow from revenue through 
a decision-making process under the budget constraint. Therefore, the money 
circulation structure is composed of these bidirectional flows between expenditure 
and revenue. The bidirectional flows brings bidirectional causality to a monetary 
economy. 
Although the general equilibrium theory considers causality from revenue to 
expenditure, it does not consider causality from expenditure to revenue. This is a 
problem of the theory. We ought to construct a theory of expenditure optimization 
in which bidirectional causality is reflected. This is the money circulation 
optimization theory. 
The author intends to publish a paper, which shows the welfare economic 
foundation of the paradox of thrift using the money circulation optimization in the 
case where saving is limited to hoarding. As an introduction of the intended paper, 
this paper provides a simple explanation for hoarding loss using some graphs. The 
author hopes this simple explanation promotes understanding of the intended 
paper. 
 
2. Budget Constraint of a Monetary Economy 
We first make an assumption of this paper clear. In reality, there are many 
economic agents. However, in order to simplify the explanation, this paper 
supposes that there exists only a single individual agent in the relevant society. 
This supposition of the so-called representative agent has a risk, which could cause 
a misunderstanding of the following description. We will explain this risk later. 
In this paper, we discuss a primitive monetary economy. This primitive 
economy is not a faithful description of our current monetary economy, but the 
working of a more realistic monetary economy is too complicated to understand. 
Hence, we think that the assumption of a primitive economy is an appropriate 
primary approach. 
One assumption of the primitive economy is that money is neither produced nor 
disappears in the relevant space-time, which refers to the sphere which satisfies 
both the relevant society and the relevant term. In addition, it is assumed that 
money is not transferred between the relevant society and its outside. 
We define expenditure as transferring money to the relevant space-time, and 
revenue as money being transferred from the relevant space-time. Agents in a 
monetary economy can expend money they receive, but the received money cannot 
be disposed as expenditure before or exactly at the time it is received. Another 
problem of the general equilibrium theory is not to consider this irreversible 
disposal. We must note that revenue can be expended only timeirreversibly. We 
call this the disposal irreversibility principle. 
Based on this principle, if the relevant term is divided into infinitesimally short 
terms, the revenue of each divided shortterm cannot be expended in the same term. 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 3(2), S. Miura, p.265-289. 
267 
We call such a shortterm a basic-term. For the sake of simplicity, this paper 
assumes that the relevant term consists of only two basic-terms. 
Hoarding is defined as money which is expendable but is not expended in a 
basic-term. Note that non-expendable money in a basic-term is not called hoarding 
even if it exists in the basic-term. Accordingly, revenue in a basic-term does not 
become hoarding in the same term because it is not expendable within the term 
based on the disposal irreversibility principle. 
In order to connect expenditure optimization with money circulation analysis, it 
is indispensable to construct budget constraint in keeping with the disposal 
irreversible principle. The budget constraint used in this paper is a special case of 
the irreversibility budget constraint reported in Miura (2015b).
3 
We will explain a 
reason of this indispensability of the irreversible principle later. 
As it is assumed that money does not disappear and is not transferred to the 
outside, the budget is either being expended or being hoarded. Therefore, Xt+Ht=Bt 
holds where Bt refers to the budget of Basic-term t, Xt refers to expenditure in 
Basic-term t, and Ht refers to hoarding in Basic-term t. This formula is the basis of 
the budget constraint of Basic-term t. 
Next, we consider the background of the budget. Due to the definition of the 
basic-term, a candidate of the budget in a basic-term is limited to the money 
available at the beginning of the basic-term. Therefore, B1=Ψ holds where Ψ refers 
to money possessed at the beginning of the relevant term. Since we assume that 
money is not produced or transferred from the outside, Ψ also represents the money 
stock in the relevant space-time. Eventually, the budget constraint of the first basic-
term is X1+H1=Ψ. 
Money expended in the first basic-term (X1) is lost, but money hoarded in the 
first basic-term (H1) is still available at the beginning of the second basic-term. 
Therefore, the latter becomes an element of the budget in the second basic-term 
(B2). Moreover, due to the definition of the basic-term, the revenue of the first 
basic-term cannot be disposed in the same term and is retained entirely at the 
beginning of the second basic-term. Therefore, the revenue also becomes an 
element of the budget. Candidates of B2 are limited to these hoarding and revenue 
because we assume that money is neither produced nor transferred from the 
outside. Let Yt be revenue of Basic-term t. From the above, we can derive 
B2=H1+Y1. Eventually, the budget constraint of the second basic-term is given by 
X2+H2=H1+Y1. 
Hereby, the budget constraints of each basic-term have been determined. We 
will also clarify how money possessed at the end of the relevant term is decided. 
Whereas expended money of the second basic-term (X2) is lost by the agent, 
hoarded money of the second basic-term (H2) is still possessed at the end of the 
term. Furthermore, the revenue from the second basic-term (Y2) adds to the 
termend possession. Hence, if we let Ω be the quantity possessed at the end of the 
relevant term, Ω=H2+Y2 holds. We call this the termend settlement formula. 
The set of these budget constraints of the two basic-terms and the settlement 
formula is the irreversibility budget constraint. However, it is not perfect as a 
monetary budget constraint of the whole societybecause it reflects only the money 
flow from revenue to expenditure. In order to express money circulation 
completely, the money flow from expenditure to revenue must also be considered. 
Such a consideration is indeed the essence of our money circulation optimization. 
Note that someone must receive money expended by another. Therefore, the 
quantity of expenditure and that of revenue are always equal in the whole society. 
That is, Xt=Yt holds for any Basic-term t. We call this the law of transfer equality. 
This law also expresses that expenditure of the whole society refluxes to its own 
revenue. In other words, the law of transfer equality is a quantitative expression of 
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the whole expenditure reflux, which represents the money flow from expenditure to 
revenue in the whole society (Miura, 2015b). By incorporating the law into the 
irreversibility budget constraint, the constraint of the whole society can reflect the 
two money flows, which compose the money circulation. We call such a constraint 
the irreversibility reflux budget constraint of the whole society. For the sake of 
brevity, we call it the whole budget constraint hereafter. This is an authentic 
monetary budget constraint of the whole society. 
We aim to derive the whole budget constraint concretely. Since the 
irreversibility constraint of the first basic-term (X1+H1=Ψ) does not include 
revenue, the law of transfer equality cannot have an effect on it. Therefore, the 
whole budget constraint of the first basic-term is the same as its irreversibility 
budget constraint. On the other hand, the irreversibility constraint of the second 
basic-term includes revenue, thus the law has an effect on it. 
As derived above, the budget of the second basic-term is equal to H1+Y1. 
Considering the law of transfer equality in the first basic-term (X1=Y1), the budget 
is equal to X1+H1. This is also equal to Ψ due to the constraint of the first basic-
term. Hence, the budget of the second basic-term becomes Ψ. Substituting this for 
the constraint of the second basic-term, it can be rewritten as X2+H2=Ψ. This is the 
whole budget constraint of the second basic-term. 
Therefore, the whole budget constraint of each basic-term can be denoted as 
Xt+Ht=Ψ. Since Ψ represents the money stock in the relevant space-time, we can 
see that the whole budget constraint is nothing but a constraint for expenditure by 
money stock. 
This constraint is essentially the same as the cash-in-advance constraint applied 
to the whole society.
4
 However, it must be noted that it is not an axiom, but a 
theorem derived from the irreversibility budget constraint and the law of transfer 
equality. 
Let us suppose that we use a budget constraint which permits timereversible 
disposal such as X1+H1=Ψ+Y1 or X2+H2=H1+Y2. If we substitute the law of 
transfer equality to these constraints, they become H1=Ψ or H2=H1. Accordingly, 
expenditure disappears from them. If expenditure disappears from the budget 
constraint, the agent can expend infinitely. This infinite expenditure qualitatively 
expresses that money circulates infinitely in a temporally closed place. Therefore, 
money stock cannot become a constraint for expenditure in the case where money 
can be disposed time reversibly. A constraint by money stock is a product of time-
irreversible disposal in a money circulation structure.
5
 
In addition, from the term end settlement formula (Ω=H2+Y2) and the law of 
transfer equality in the second basic-term (X2=Y2), we can derive Ω=H2+X2. Since 
X2+H2=Ψ holds by the whole budget constraint, Ω=Ψ is satisfied. This shows that 
the money stocks are equal at the beginning and the end of a relevant term. We call 
this the law of money conservation. 
Thus, we can conclude Ψ=B1=B2=Ω holds. This conclusion indicates that the 
quantity of money stock in the relevant space-time is constant. It is a natural 
conclusion from the assumption that money is not produced, does not disappear, 
and is not transferred between the outside of the relevant society. 
Expenditure and hoarding must be non-negative by their economic meaning, 
thus Xt≥0 and Ht≥0 hold. Considering these with the whole budget constraint, we 
can derive 0≤X1≤Ψ and 0≤X2≤Ψ. We sometimes indicate this as the whole budget 
constraint hereafter. 
The whole budget constraint can be illustrated as the following graph. 
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Graph 1. Whole Budget Constraint 
 
Following this, the axis of expenditure in the first basic-term (X1) is taken to be 
horizontal, and the axis of expenditure in the second basic-term (X2) is taken to be 
vertical. A shaded area including boundary lines is the range of the whole budget 
constraint. X1=Ψ holds if hoarding is not executed in the first basic-term, and X2=Ψ 
holds if hoarding is not executed in the second basic-term. Therefore, money is not 
hoarded at all in Point A(Ψ, Ψ). We call this point the non-hoarding state. 
 
3. Feasible Expenditure Set 
The whole budget constraint is not a unique constraint for feasible expenditure. 
In order to explain another constraint, we first have to clarify why money is 
expended. 
Money is transferred for various reasons, but the main reason is for exchanging 
commodities. Further, consumption goods are fundamental commodities. Our 
primitive economy assumes that money is transferred only for trading with 
consumption goods. This assumption can also be expressed so that the 
representative agent is an individual proprietor who sells only consumption goods. 
Note that the method of saving is limited to hoarding in our primitive economy 
by this assumption. In reality, there exist other methods of saving including 
deposit, loan and equity investment. Since they are transferred from their owner to 
another agent while saving, we call them transfer saving collectively. Even though 
transfer saving has a large importance in a modern economy, it is not considered in 
a primary approach of this paper. 
Moreover, we assume that traded consumption goods are of only one kind. 
Then, the price of a basic-term is defined as the expenditure of the basic-term per 
unit of consumption goods exchanged with the expenditure. Let Ct be a quantity of 
consumption goods and Pt be price level in Basic-term t. Due to the definition of 
price, Pt=Xt/Ct holds. 
Then, we classify features of price change caused by change in expenditure. If 
the changing rate of price is less than that of the expenditure, we call that price as 
sticky. If the changing rate of price is equal to that of expenditure, we refer to that 
price as flexible. If the changing rate of price is more than that of expenditure, we 
call that price as hypersensitive. 
Hoarding loss is a phenomenon which occurs in the case of price stickiness. In 
order to simplify the following explanation, we hereafter assume that price is fixed, 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
A
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which is defined as the price of a basic-term that never changes even if expenditure 
of any basic-term changes. Price fixedness is a special case of price stickiness. 
The second constraint for expenditure is that expended money must be 
exchanged with real commodity. In order to express this exchange constraint, we 
define the real commodity supply set as the combination of commodities in each 
basic-term, which can be supplied. Moreover, in order to enable comparison to 
nominal expenditure, we define a nominal commodity supply set as follows. A 
combination of expenditure (X1, X2) belongs to the nominal commodity supply set 
if and only if a combination of consumption goods (X1/P1, X2/P2) belongs to the 
real commodity supply set. The nominal commodity supply set represents the 
expenditure quantity, which is needed to purchase supplied commodities. 
The nominal commodity supply set can be illustrated as follows. 
 
 
Graph 2. Nominal Commodity Supply Set 
 
The shaded area including boundary lines is a range of the nominal commodity 
supply set. Although this set is illustrated in a convex shape, this shape was 
prepared only to easily distinguish it from the whole budget constraint. Note that 
we do not set any special suppositions regarding the shape of the nominal supply 
set. 
Expenditure which does not belong to the nominal commodity supply setcannot 
be realized because commodities which ought to be exchanged with the 
expenditure are not supplied. Accordingly, the feasible expenditure of the whole 
society must belong to both the whole budget constraint and the nominal supply 
set. Based on this, we call the common part of the two a feasible expenditure set. 
The feasible expenditure set is illustrated as follows. 
 
X₁
X₂
O
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Graph 3. Feasible Expenditure Set 
 
A shaded area including boundary lines is a range of the feasible expenditure 
set. In GRAPH 3, Point A, which refers to the non-hoarding state, does not belong 
to the feasible expenditure set. This situation shows that money must be hoarded 
because commodities are sold out even given low expenditure. We call this 
undersupplied hoarding. 
Considering Xt=PtCt holds, the nominal supply set becomes small if price 
becomes low. On the other hand, the whole budget constraint does not vary by a 
price change. In this case, undersupplied hoarding occurs easily because 
commodities are easily sold out and use of money is lost. 
Even if undersupplied hoarding occurs, all supplied commodities can be 
consumed. Therefore, this is not a hoarding which brings an economic loss. We 
should pay attention that all types of hoarding do not cause a loss. 
Hereafter, we assume that the whole budget constraint is included in the 
nominal supply set. It is a situation as the following figure shows. 
 
 
Graph 4. Feasible Expenditure Set 
 
In this case, Point A is always included in the feasible expenditure set, thus the 
undersupplied hoarding does not occur. Further, the feasible expenditure set 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
A
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
A
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accords with the whole budget constraint. Hence, we identify the whole budget 
constraint with the feasible expenditure set hereafter. 
 
4. Social Optimal Solution 
We assume that the agent obtains utility from consumption goods in two basic-
terms. By this assumption, the utility function is denoted as U[C1, C2]. Further, we 
assume that the utility is not satiated by consumption. That is, the more 
commodities are consumed in a basic-term, the more the utility increases, provided 
that the consumption does not vary the other conditions. Mathematically, this 
assumption is denoted as ∂U/∂Ct>0. 
For the sake of convenience in our money circulation optimization, we 
transform the utility of real consumption (U[C1, C2]) into that of nominal 
expenditure (U[X1, X2]). We call this transformed utilitythe nominal utility 
function. 
We will clarify how the utility varies by a variation of expenditure. First, we 
suppose that an effect on real consumption by nominal expenditure occurs only 
through price level. This supposition implies that the effect is judged by the price 
formula Cv=Xv/Pv. Based on this supposition, ∂Cv/∂Xv=1/Pv holds for any basic-
term. 
Moreover, we put a supposition that utility obtained from nominal expenditure 
is determined only by utility obtained from real consumption which is directly 
exchanged with the expenditure. Based on this supposition, we justify 
∂U/∂Xv=(∂U/∂Cv)(∂Cv/∂Xv). 
∂Cv/∂Xv=1/Pv is confirmed some time ago, thus ∂U/∂Xv=(∂U/∂Cv)/Pv is 
satisfied. ∂U/∂Cv>0 holds by the assumption of non-satiation, and Pv>0 also holds. 
Hence, ∂U/∂Xv>0 is derived. This conclusion represents that, the more money is 
expended in a basic-term, the more the utility increases, provided that the 
expenditure does not change the other conditions. We call this the monotonicity of 
the nominal utility function. 
In addition, we introduce the following two suppositions for the nominal utility 
function. First, we suppose that a nominal marginal utility of the basic-term is not 
affected by expenditure of another basic-term. As a result, the marginal utility of a 
basic-term becomes a function of expenditure only in the same term. Based on this 
independency of nominal marginal utilities, we denote the marginal utility of 
Basic-term t as Ut[Xt]. Secondly, the nominal marginal utility is supposed to 
diminish as expenditure increases. 
Since we assume that only a single agent exists, the utility function and the 
social welfare function are identified. Based on this, we define a social optimal 
solution as a state in which the utility is maximized within the range of the feasible 
expenditure set. We derive the social optimal solution while considering that the 
feasible set agrees with the whole budget constraint. 
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Graph 5. Social Optimal Solution 
 
Curves falling downward to the right represent indifference curves, which are 
graphical expressions of the nominal utility function. By the monotonicity of the 
utility, if X1 increases, the utility also increases provided that X2 is constant. 
Similarly, if X2 increases, the utility also increases provided that X1 is constant. 
Therefore, the social optimal solution is both on X1=Ψ and X2=Ψ. That is, the 
solution is Point A, which is a non-hoarding state. We can see that the utility is 
objectively maximized if the agent does not hoard money at all in our primitive 
economy. 
Assume a situation described as the following graph. 
 
 
Graph 6. Money Shortage Loss 
 
The social optimal solution is Point A, but it is not an optimal solution in the 
range that real commodities can be supplied. Point P is such an optimal solution 
where utility is maximized in the nominal supply set. This point is a social optimal 
solution if we ignore the constraint of money stock. We call it the pure social 
optimal solution. 
In the case of the preceding graph, the feasibility of the pure social optimal 
solution is blocked by the whole budget constraint. This economic loss occurs 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
A
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
A
P
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because money stock is too shortage to execute the expenditure needed to purchase 
all supplied commodities. Therefore, we call this a money shortage loss. 
Considering Xt=PtCt holds, the nominal supply set becomes large if price 
becomes high. On the other hand, the whole budget constraint does not vary by a 
price change. As a result, the money shortage loss is easy to occur. 
However, under-consumption is not caused only by this reason. Even if the pure 
social optimal solution accords with the non-hoarding state, there is a possibility 
that the agent hoards money and an economic loss occurs. We will clarify the cause 
of this hoarding loss. 
 
5. Individual Optimal Solution 
In order to judge whether hoarding loss occurs or not, we have to examine 
expenditure optimization by an individual agent. For the purpose, we will clarify 
the budget constraint of an individual agent. 
Note that this paper supposes that there exists only a single agent in the relevant 
society. Therefore, some may think that the individual budget constraint ought to 
be the same as the whole budget constraint. This thought is appropriate if we 
regard this supposition as literally true. 
However, that supposition was introduced only for simplifying an explanation. 
It does not represent the truth in a monetary economy faithfully. Exchange does not 
occur if plural agents do not exist, and money cannot exist if exchange does not 
occur. Plurality of agents is essential for a monetary economy. Accordingly, an 
individual agent and the whole society must be distinguished to understand a 
monetary economy. Since this paper aims at a simple explanation, the distinction is 
expressed only by a difference in the budget constraint. The representative agent 
should not be interpreted as a literal expression of a single agent but should be 
interpreted as a collective expression of plural agents. Based on this idea, we 
assume that the individual budget constraint of the represent agent has the same 
structure as the budget constraint which individual agents face in the case where 
plural agents exist. 
The individual agent shares the irreversibility budget constraint with the whole 
society. The irreversibility constraint is X1+H1=Ψ and X2+H2=H1+Y1. When we 
derived the whole budget constraint, we incorporated the law of transfer equality 
into the constraint. This law is a reflection that expenditure and revenue are the 
same events in the whole society. 
However, even if an individual agent expends, their own revenue is not 
guaranteed to increase. Expenditure and revenue are two different events for an 
individual agent. As a result, an individual agent optimizes expenditure under the 
assumption that expenditure does not affect revenue.
6
 
We intend to eliminate hoarding from the constraint for a convenient 
explanation. H1 is included in both the budget constraints of the first basic-term and 
that of the second basic-term. We make one hoarding correspond to one constraint. 
If we aggregate the budget constraints of two basic-terms and arrange the 
aggregated formula, we can derive X1+X2+H2=Ψ+Y1. This formula can be 
regarded as the budget constraint of the entire relevant term. We can replace this 
with the constraint of the second basic-term. As a result, the individual budget 
constraint becomes a set of the following equations. 
X1+H1=Ψ. 
X1+X2+H2=Ψ+Y1. 
Thus, we have succeeded in making one hoarding correspond to one constraint. 
Then, we apply the non-negativity of hoarding (H1≥0 and H2≥0) to these equations. 
We can derive X1≤Ψ and X1+X2≤Ψ+Y1. We have thus succeeded in eliminating 
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hoarding from the constraints. The individual budget constraint is a common part 
of these constraints and the non-negativity of expenditure (X1≥0 and X2≥0). It is 
illustrated as the following graph. 
 
 
Graph 7. Individual Budget Constraint 
 
We should pay attention to difference of shapes between the whole budget 
constraint and the individual budget constraint. Whereas the former constraint is a 
square, the latter constraint is a trapezoid. This difference reflects the effect of 
expenditure on revenue. 
The shape of the individual budget constraint in simultaneous choice, which as 
usual economics shows, is a triangle. The reason why the constraint in our 
temporal choice does not shape into a triangle but shapes into a trapezoid is 
because time irreversible disposal was considered here. 
The individual agent maximizes the nominal utility functionunder this 
constraint. By the monotonicity of the nominal utility, if X2 increases, the utility 
also increases provided that X1 is constant. As a result, the individual optimal 
solution satisfies X1+X2=Ψ+Y1. Therefore, the agent does not hoard money in the 
second basic-term. This is intuitively correct because hoarding in the last basic-
term cannot be expended in the relevant term and is therefore ineffective. 
Hereafter, X1+X2=Ψ+Y1 is called the individual budget line. 
Next, we will examine an individual optimal condition. We can classify the 
condition into two cases. 
The first case is illustrated as follows. 
 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
Y₁
ψ+Y1
ψ+Y1
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Graph 8. Individual Optimal Solution (Inner Solution) 
 
In this case, the individual optimal solution is Point M(X1*, X2*), in which the 
slope of the tangent of an indifference curve and the slope of the budget line are 
equal. This solution is an inner solution. 
Note that the following equation holds by the formula of the total derivative. 
dU=U1[X1]dX1+U2[X2]dX2. 
Since the indifference curve represents a combination of expenditure in which 
utilities are equal, dU=0 is satisfied on the curve. Therefore, we can derive 
dX2/dX1=−U1[X1]/U2[X2] as a slope of the tangent of the indifference curve. On the 
other hand, the slope of the budget line (X1+X2=Ψ+Y1) is equal to −1. Accordingly, 
if we let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure which satisfies the individual 
optimal condition, X1*+X2*=Ψ+Y1 and −U1[X1*]/U2[X2*]=−1 have to hold. The 
latter condition can be rewritten as U1[X1*]=U2[X2*]. This condition is nothing but 
the law of equi-marginal utility, which was first stated by Hermann Heinrich 
Gossen (Jolink & Van Daal, 1998; Ikeda, 2000; Meijer & Vogal, 2000; Meijer, 
2000; Niehans, 2008). 
However, the law of equi-marginal utility is not a universal condition for 
maximizing utility. If we let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure whose 
marginal utilities are equalized, 0≤X1*≤Ψ must be satisfied to hold the law. Next, 
we examine the individual optimal condition in a case where X1*>Ψ holds. This 
second case is illustrated as follows. 
 
X₁
X₂
O X1*
X2*
ψ+Y1
ψ+Y1
ψ
Y1
M
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Graph 9. Individual Optimal Solution (Corner Solution) 
 
In this case, Point M(X1*, X2*), in which marginal utilities are equalized, is not 
an individual optimal solution because the money needed for the realization of X1* 
does not exist. A feasible budget line is X1+X2=Ψ+Y1 in the range of 0≤X1≤Ψ. An 
optimal solution of this case is Point M’(Ψ, Y1), which satisfies the feasible budget 
line and is the closest point to Point M. This solution is a corner solution. In this 
case, money is not hoarded in the first basic-term. 
Additionally, there is a possibility that X1*<0. In this case, the X1-coordinate of 
the individual optimal solution becomes zero. That is, not to exchange at all is 
optimal in the first basic-term. Although this is not an impossible situation, it 
seems to be economically valueless. This paper does not consider this valueless 
case. We assume that an individual optimal solution of expenditure is derived as a 
positive value. 
Thus, we have succeeded in deriving the individual optimal solution 
provisionally. However, the solution has not been sufficiently clarified yet because 
it is not obvious how revenue is decided. Note that the above solution reflects only 
money flow from revenue to expenditure, which is expressed by the irreversibility 
budget constraint. It has not yet been shown where the expended money goes. A 
money circulation structure is never expressed entirely unless the money flow from 
expenditure to revenue is also considered. Revenue is decided by this whole 
expenditure reflux. This decision principle of revenue is a core idea of our money 
circulation optimization. We have to continue our examination to incorporate the 
effect of the whole expenditure reflux into the individual optimal solution. 
 
5. Time Preference Regarding Expenditure 
Whether an individual agent hoards money or not depends on the time 
preference type with respect to expenditure of the agent. We classify three 
preference types by comparing nominal marginal utilities of different basic-terms 
obtained from the same amount of expenditure. 
Let X be an expenditure level. 
If U1[X]>U2[X] is satisfied, past expenditure gives larger marginal utility than 
future expenditure at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is defined as the agent 
preferring past expenditure at an expenditure level X. 
If U1[X]<U2[X] is satisfied, future expenditure gives larger marginal utility than 
past expenditure at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is defined as the agent 
preferring future expenditure at an expenditure level X. 
X₁
X₂
O X1*
X2*
ψ+Y1
ψ+Y1
ψ
Y1
M'
M
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If U1[X]=U2[X] is satisfied, past expenditure and future expenditure give the 
same marginal utility at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is defined as the 
agent preferring expenditure time neutrally at an expenditure level X. 
Then, we suppose a uniformity of time preference regarding expenditure level. 
This uniformity means that time preference does not depend on the expenditure 
level. If an agent in a basic-term prefers the past expenditure at an expenditure 
level, the agent also prefers the past expenditure in any another expenditure level. 
In the case that the agent prefers the future or time neutrality, the same relationship 
is supposed. Uniformity may not be an appropriate supposition in reality, but this 
paper supposes to simplify analysis. 
We will explain the meaning of this uniformity using the following graphs, 
which express the relationship between expenditure (X) and the nominal marginal 
utility (MU). 
 
 
Graph 10. Expenditure and Marginal Utility (Past Preference Type) 
 
Curves exist in a positive area of the nominal marginal utility. This reflects the 
monotonicity of the nominal utility. Further, curves fall downward to the right. 
This reflects the diminishment of the marginal utility. The curve of a basic-term 
does not intersect with the curve of another basic-term. This is a graphical 
representation of the uniformity of time preference. 
In GRAPH 10, the curve of the first basic-term is always located above the 
curve of the second basic-term. Hence, this is a graph that represents the case 
where the agent prefers past expenditure. Based on a supposition of the uniformity, 
an individual agent is called a past preference type if the agent prefers past 
expenditure. 
Xt* expresses the expenditure of Basic-term t in the case where the nominal 
marginal utility is equal to MU*. Note that X1*>X2*is satisfiedregardless of the 
level of marginal utilityMU*. This suggests that, if marginal utilities are equal, the 
past expenditure will always be larger than future expenditure. This is a feature of 
the past preference type. 
Next, see the following graph. 
 
X
MU
O X1*X2*
MU*
←U1=U1[X1]
U2=U2[X2]→
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Graph 11. Expenditure and Marginal Utility (Future Preference Type) 
 
In GRAPH 11, the curve of the first basic-term is always located below the 
curve of the second basic-term. This graph shows that the agent prefers future 
expenditure. Based on the supposition of uniformity, an individual agent is called a 
future preference type if the agent prefers future expenditure. 
Note that X1*<X2* holds irrespective of the level of marginalutility MU*. This 
indicates that, if marginal utilities are equal, future expenditure is always larger 
than past expenditure. This is a feature of the future preference type. 
Moreover, see the following graph. 
 
 
Graph 12. Expenditure and Marginal Utility (Neutral Preference Type) 
 
In Graph 12, the curve of the first basic-term is overlaid with the curve of the 
second basic-term. This graph represents the case where the agent preference is 
time neutral. We earlier stated that the two curves do not intersect under the 
supposition of uniformity, but only this case is an exception. Based on the 
supposition of the uniformity, the individual agent is called a time neutral 
preference type if the agent prefers expenditure time neutrally. 
Note that X1*=X2* holds even regardless of the level of nominal marginal 
utility MU*. This shows that, if marginal utilities are equal, the past expenditure 
X
MU
O X2*X1*
MU*
←U2=U2[X2]
U1=U1[X1]→
X
MU
O X1*=X2*
MU*
←U1[X1]=U2[X2]
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and the future expenditure are always equal. This is a feature of the neutral 
preference type. 
We have thus obtained quantitative relationships between past and future 
expenditure where nominal marginal utilities are equal. We will illustrate these 
relationships with a graph of indifference curves. 
 
 
Graph 13. Indifference Curves of Each Time Preference Type 
 
Let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure whose marginal utilities are 
equal.As confirmed in the preceding section, a slope of the tangent line of (X1*, 
X2*) is equal to −1. Further, this line passes through (X1*, X2*). Hence, it can be 
expressed as X2−X2*=−1(X1−X1*). This can be rewritten as X1+X2= X1*+X2*. The 
straight line downward to the right represents this line. 
The straight line upward to the right represents the line representing the 
scenario where expenditures of two basic-terms are equal. Based on the above 
conclusion, if the agent is a time neutral preference type, the point (X1*, X2*) exists 
on the expenditure equal line. The middle curve represents an indifference curve of 
this type. If the agent is a past preference type, the point (X1*, X2*) exists on the 
right of the expenditure equal line. The most rightward curve represents an 
indifference curve of this type. If the agent is a future preference type, the point 
(X1*, X2*) exists on the left of the expenditure equal line. The most leftward curve 
represents an indifference curve of this type. 
 
6. Foundation of Hoarding Loss 
Our money circulation optimization is an optimal method of expenditure which 
reflects two money flows between expenditure and revenue. The flow from 
revenue to expenditure is expressed as an expenditure optimization under the 
budget constraint, which includes revenue. The flow from expenditure to revenue 
is expressed by the law of transfer equality, which is a quantitative expression of 
the whole expenditure reflux. Based on this idea, an individual optimal solution of 
the money circulation optimization is defined as an expenditure optimal solution by 
an individual decision-making which is consistent with the law of transfer equality. 
However, there is a further difficulty to derive the solution. We have to derive 
expenditure using the budget which includes revenue. Hence, revenue must be 
decided beforeexpenditure is decided. On the other hand, revenue is decided by 
expenditure through the whole expenditure reflux. Accordingly, we fall into a 
X₁
X₂
O X1*+X2*
X1*+X2*
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circular argument such that expenditure must be decided beforeexpenditure is 
decided. 
To overcome this difficulty, we adopt the following method. Note that our main 
concern is whether the non-hoarding state, which is a social optimal solution, is an 
individual optimal solution or not. We first attempt to judge it. 
We initially suppose that the agent forms an expenditure plan not tohoard 
money at all. Next, we derive revenue according to the initial expenditure plan and 
the law of transfer equality. Hereby, the budget is determined provisionally. The 
agent is supposed to optimize their expenditure under the provisional budget. As a 
result, a provisional solution of expenditure will be derived. 
An equivalent condition for the authentic individual optimal solution is that 
both of the expenditure optimization and the law of transfer equality hold 
consistently. If the provisional solution agrees with the initial expenditure plan, the 
optimal solution of expenditure to not hoard money at all is consistent with the law 
of transfer equality. Therefore, we can conclude that it is an authentic individual 
optimal solution. If the provisional solution does not agree with the initial 
expenditure plan, it is impossible that the non-hoarding state cannot satisfy both the 
expenditure optimization and the law of transfer equality. Hence, we can conclude 
that it is not an authentic individual optimal solution. 
Based on this policy, we initially suppose that the agent forms an expenditure 
plan such that (X1, X2)=(Ψ, Ψ). Due to this expenditure plan and the law of transfer 
equality, we can derive Y1=Ψ. Since Ψ+Y1=2Ψ is satisfied, the feasible individual 
budget line provisionally becomes X1+X2=2Ψ in the range of 0≤X1≤Ψ. We will 
derive an individual optimal solution under this constraint and examine it with the 
three time preference types. 
First, we examine where the agent is the time neutral preference type. As 
confirmed in Section 4, the individual optimal solution must satisfy the equality of 
marginal utilities unless expenditure of the first basic-term exceeds a quantity of 
the money stock. Let (X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure which satisfies 
the provisional budget line and whose marginal utilities are equal. Due to the latter 
condition, this point exists on the expenditure equal line in the case of the neutral 
preference type. Therefore, (X1*, X2*) lies on an intersection point of X1+X2=2Ψ 
and X1=X2. The intersection point becomes (X1*, X2*)=(Ψ, Ψ), which is the non-
hoarding state. The following graph illustrates this. 
 
 
Graph 14. Individual Optimization (Neutral Preference Type) 
 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
2ψ
2ψ
A
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Note that the shaded area including boundary lines refers to the whole budget 
constraint. 
Point A represents (Ψ, Ψ). Since X1*=Ψ holds, this point lies on the feasible 
budget line as confirmed in Section 4. Therefore, Point A qualifies as an individual 
optimal solution. This provisional solution accords with the initial expenditure 
plan. We can thus conclude that the non-hoarding state is an authentic individual 
solution in this case. Hence, individual rational behavior achieves social optimality 
if the agent is the time neutral preference type. 
Next, we examine the case where the agent is the past preference type. Let (X1*, 
X2*) be a combination of expenditure which satisfies the provisional budget line 
(X1+X2=2Ψ) and whose marginal utilities are equal. As confirmed in Section 5, the 
latter condition requires that this point exists on the right side of the expenditure 
equal line(X1>X2) in the case of the past preference type. This scenario is 
illustrated in the following graph. 
 
 
Graph 15. Individual Optimization (Past Preference Type) 
 
Point A represents (Ψ, Ψ), and Point B represents (X1*, X2*). Since 
X1*+X2*=2Ψ and X1*>X2* are satisfied, 2X1*>X1*+X2*=2Ψ holds. Hence, we can 
derive X1*>Ψ. This conclusion implies that Point B is not included within the 
feasible budget line as confirmed in Section 4. Therefore, Point B does not qualify 
as a feasible optimal solution even though marginal utilities are equalized at this 
point. The authentic solution is Point A, which satisfies the feasible budget line and 
is the closest to Point B. This provisional solution agrees with the initial 
expenditure plan. We can conclude that the non-hoarding state is an authentic 
individual optimal solution in this case. Similar to the case of the neutral preference 
type, individual rational behavior also achieves social optimality if the agent is the 
past preference type. 
Finally, we examine the case where the agent is the future preference type. Let 
(X1*, X2*) be a combination of expenditure which satisfies the provisional budget 
line (X1+X2=2Ψ) and whose marginal utilities are equal. As confirmed in Section 
5, the latter condition requires that this point exists on the left side of the 
expenditure equal line (X1<X2) in the case of the future preference type. This 
scenario is illustrated in the following graph. 
 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
2ψ
2ψ
X1*
X2*
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B
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Graph 16: Individual Optimization (Future Preference Type) 
 
Point A represents (Ψ, Ψ), and Point B represents (X1*, X2*). Since 
X1*+X2*=2Ψ and X1*<X2* are satisfied, 2X1*<X1*+X2*=2Ψ holds. Hence, we can 
derive X1*<Ψ. This conclusion implies that Point B is included in the feasible 
budget line as confirmed in Section 4. Further, since the marginal utilities of this 
point are equalized, its utility is higher than the utilities of all other points which 
satisfy the feasible budget line. Therefore, Point B is an optimal solution under the 
provisional budget. However, this solution does not agree with the initial 
expenditure plan, which is equivalent to Point A. At this stage, we can conclude 
that the non-hoarding state is not an authentic individual optimal solution. 
Judging simply, Point B seems to the optimal solution. Then, how can the agent 
fulfill Point B? Let H1* be a hoarding quantity when the agent expends X1*. 
H1*=Ψ−X1* holds by the budget constraint of the first basic-term. Note that H1*>0 
is satisfied because X1*<Ψ holds. From the definition of H1* and what (X1*, X2*) 
satisfies the individual budget line, we can derive 
X2*=2Ψ−X1*=Ψ+(Ψ−X1*)=Ψ+H1*. 
This calculation implies that the agent can change their expenditure plan from 
Point A to Point B by hoarding some money in the first basic-term and adding the 
hoarded money to expenditure of the second basic-term. That is, the agent can 
obtain higher utility by hoarding than by not hoarding at all. We can see that the 
agent hoards money if they behave rationally as maximizing their utility. This 
seems to be a main reason that saving is often regarded as a virtue in a modern 
society.
7
 
However, is Point B really an individual optimal solution? Since this point 
maximizes utility under the individual budget line, it seems to be qualified as the 
solution. Nevertheless, if it can be realized, a strange situation occurs. 
Since X2*=Ψ+H1* and H1*>0 hold, X2*>Ψ ought to be satisfied. This concludes 
that B(X1*, X2*) is not included within the whole budget constraint as illustrated in 
GRAPH 15. This means that expenditure which exceeds money stock must be 
executed in a basic-term. How does the agent expend exceeding the money stock? 
Do they use the same money repeatedly? Note that the reason why money can be 
used repeatedly is that expended money is received by someone and they expend 
the money again. However, it is impossible to do so in a single basic-term if we 
recall the definition of basic-term. The whole budget constraint is nothing but a 
reflection of this impossibility. 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
2ψ
2ψ
X1*
X2*
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B
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On the other hand, money is hoarded and sent to the second basic-term. As a 
result, the agent in the second basic-term can expend more money at Point B than 
at Point A, can’t they? If they can’t do so, where does the hoarded money 
disappear? It is unlikely that the hoarded money disappears. 
Then, what happens? 
We will clarify the answer. 
Point B is impossible. We should pay attention to the relationship between 
expenditure and revenue in the first basic-term. In Point B, X1*<Ψ holds as 
confirmed above. However, Y1=Ψ was assumed when the budget constraint was 
set. Therefore, expenditure and revenue are not the same quantity in the first basic-
term. This contradicts the law of transfer equality, which is an objective law in a 
monetary economy. This is a definite reason why Point B cannot be realized. 
Point B certainly satisfies the law of equi-marginal equalities and the feasible 
budget line, but they are not all of optimal conditions. The individual optimal 
solution of our money circulation optimization is defined as an expenditure optimal 
solution which is consistent with the law of transfer equality. Point B does not 
satisfy this optimal condition,thus it is not qualified to be an authentic optimal 
solution. 
We ought to consider an effect of the law of transfer equality in the case where 
money is hoarded. When we derived Point B as an optimal solution, the agent 
optimized their utility under the budget line X1+X2=2Ψ. We should recall that the 
original budget line is X1+X2=Ψ+Y1. The former budget line is derived because we 
assume Y1=Ψ. However, when the agent decides to hoard H1*, expenditure of the 
first basic-term is decreased from Ψ to X1*. Due to the work of the law of transfer 
equality, this decrease of X1 causes a decrease of Y1, which changes from Ψ to 
X1*. Even though the hoarded money does not disappear, revenue is decreased 
instead. Accordingly, the budget is lowered from 2Ψ to Ψ+X1*. Based on the 
lowered budget line, the realized expenditure of the second basic-term is X2=Ψ 
when X1=X1* is satisfied. 
This situation can be illustrated as follows. 
 
 
Graph 17. Individual Optimization (Future Preference Type) 
 
Point C represents (X1*, Ψ), which is realized by hoarding H1*. The agent 
subjectively intends to change their expenditure plan from A to B by hoarding 
money, but they objectively change it from A to C because they maximize the 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
2ψ
2ψ
X1*
X2*
A
B
C
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utility while lowering the budget line. Due to the monotonicity of utility, the utility 
of Point C is less than that of Point A, which refers to the non-hoarding state and 
the social optimal solution. Although the agent hoards money in order to increase 
their utility, the hoarding actually decreases it against their intention.
8
 
Note that marginal utilities are equal at Point B. Moreover, Point B and C share 
the value of X1, and the value of X2 of Point C is lower than that of Point B. Based 
on GRAPH 11, which expresses relationship between expenditure and marginal 
utility in the case of the future preference type, X1 must decrease if X2 decreases 
wheremarginal utilities are equalized. Therefore, provided that marginal utilities 
are equalized at Point B, they cannot be equalized at Point C.If Point C is set up as 
a provisional expenditure plan, another point is chosen by expenditure 
optimization, the same as the case where Point A is set up. Hence, Point C is not an 
individual optimal solution, either. 
Then, we will examine which point the individual optimal solution is. The 
solution must satisfy the law of equi-marginal utilities and the individual budget 
constraint as a result of expenditure optimization. Moreover, the solution has to be 
consistent with the law of transfer equality. 
Let (X1**, X2**) be a combination of expenditure which represents the 
individual optimal solution. The first condition requires that X1**< X2** in the 
case of the future preference type, and the second condition requires that 
X1**+X2**=Ψ+Y1.Further, the third condition requires that X1**=Y1. Synthesizing 
these conditions, the individual optimal solution has to satisfy X1**<Ψ and 
X2**=Ψ. Moreover, we should pay attention that X2*>Ψ=X2** holds. Since X1 
must decrease if X2 decreases wheremarginal utilities are equalized, the individual 
optimal solution is located at the lower left of Point B as shown in the following 
graph. 
 
 
Graph 18. Individual Optimization (Future Preference Type) 
 
Point D (X1**, Ψ) is the individual optimal solution, which satisfies the three 
optimal conditions. Due to the monotonicity of the nominal utility function, the 
utility of Point D is less than Point A, the non-hoarding state. We can see that an 
individual optimal solution always gives a lower utility than the social optimal 
solution in the case where the agent is the future preference type. 
This hoarding loss is directly connected with a decrease in nominal expenditure. 
Nevertheless, the decrease of nominal expenditure corresponds to that of real 
X₁
X₂
O ψ
ψ
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consumption under the fixed price. Hence, this is also a realization of under-
consumption. 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
The hoarding loss occurs based on a qualitative difference between the budget 
constraint of the whole society and that of the individual agent. We will show the 
two constraints again. 
[Whole Budget Constraint] 0≤X1≤Ψ, 0≤X2≤Ψ. 
[Individual Budget Constraint] 0≤X1≤Ψ, 0≤X2, X1+X2≤Ψ+Y1. 
Graphically, whereas the whole budget constraint is a square, the individual 
budget constraint is a trapezoid. This difference depends on whether the law of 
transfer equality is incorporated in the constraint beforehand or not. Although the 
law is considered in the individual optimal solution, we must pay attention that it is 
considered after the optimization, not before. This implies that individual agents 
subjectively make decision with ignoring the law but it still has an effect 
objectively. 
In principle, the individual optimal solution must satisfy the law of equi-
marginal utilities as traditional economics has taught us. However, this is only an 
optimal condition in the case where decision-making on expenditure does not vary 
the budget. 
But in the whole society, expended money refluxes as revenue. As a result, 
expenditure varies the budget. Since this whole expenditure reflux exists, 
equalizing marginal utilities is not an objective optimal condition. The law of 
transfer equality is a quantitative expression of this whole expenditure reflux. The 
whole budget constraint is indeed an objective constraint for expenditure because it 
incorporates this law. Hence, the non-hoarding state, which is a social optimal 
solution derived under the whole budget constraint, is an objectively correct 
optimal solution regardless of whether its marginal utilities are equal or not. 
If the agent nevertheless hoards money to equalize marginal utilities, the budget 
of the entire relevant term is forcibly lowered in order to satisfy the law of transfer 
equality. This is a reflection of the whole expenditure reflux working in the 
opposite direction. Since the agent makes a decision with ignoring the reflux, 
utility of the agent is decreased contrary to their intention. 
Note that the lowering of the budget is a lowering of the individual budget.The 
objective social budget is always constant regardless of decision-making because it 
is decided only by money stock. The whole budget constraint is nothing but a 
reflection of this constancy. However, since the individual agents ignore the law of 
transfer equality, the individual budget is estranged from the objective social 
budget. As a result, the individual optimal solution is also estranged from the social 
optimal solution. 
The cause of this hoardingloss isdecision-making without recognizing the law 
of transfer equality, which is an objective truth of a monetary economy. Why does 
the agent ignore the truth? 
For an individual agent, expenditure refers to the money transferred from the 
agent to others, and revenue refers to the money transferred from others to the 
agent. Therefore, expenditure and revenue are surely separate eventsfor an 
individual agent. Their decision-making under the idea that expenditure does not 
vary the budget is not based on an erroneous factual judgment. In this sense, the 
individual agent executes a rational judgment. 
But in the whole society, expenditure and revenue are the same events namely 
money transfer. These two truths are not a contradiction because, even though 
expenditure of an individual agent does not vary their own revenue, it varies their 
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others’ revenue. However, a selfish individual agent ignores this relational truth 
because their interest is limited to their private range and they form an expenditure 
plan without considering its impact on their others’ revenue. As a result, individual 
constraint detaches from the whole budget constraint, and the agent falls into an 
irrational situation despite their rational judgment. 
This paper proved this irrationality of rationality under an assumption that the 
number of economic agents is limited to one and that of basic-terms is limited to 
two. But in the intended paper, we will assume that the numbers of agents and 
basic-terms are generalized. Then, we will prove that hoarding behavior by 
individual rational judgment brings a Pareto inefficient situation. 
This proof will put an assumption ofprice fixedness the same as this paper, but 
hoarding loss can occur in the case where price is variable. Moreover, the proof 
will assume that agents similarly prefer future expenditure as in this paper. 
However, the author already knows that hoarding loss can occur even if agents 
prefer past expenditure or time neutrality. Since this hoarding loss depends on a 
distribution, it cannot be explained using the representative agent model like this 
paper. The author also intends to publish some papers, which discusses the 
hoarding loss of these situations in the near future. 
 
Notes 
1 The author owes knowledge regarding Foster and Catchingslargely to Sasahara (1981) written in 
Japanese. 
2 The author owes knowledge regarding Föhllargely to Ito (1952) and Nagasawa (1968) written in 
Japanese. 
3 The idea of the irreversibility budget constraint was primitively suggested by Dennis Holme 
Robertson, and was developed by ShoChiehTsiang and others (Robertson, 1933; Keynes et al., 
1933; Metzler, 1948; Tsiang, 1966; Kohn, 1981; Kohn, 1988; Laidler, 1989; Van Eeghen, 2014). 
4 The cash-in-advance constraint was originally suggested by Karl Brunner, and was developed 
further by Mario Henrique Simonsen, Robert Wayne Clower and others (Brunner, 1951, pp. 167-
171; Clower, 1967; Boianovsky, 2002). 
5 This is an example that the disposal irreversibility principle can solve the second missing problem of 
the monetary budget constraint shown in Miura (2015b). A simple explanation to understand this 
truth using an analogy is provided by Miura (2016). The discussion regarding the jinn particle in a 
physics context may promote the understanding of this issue (Lossev & Novikov, 1992; Gott, 2002, 
pp. 20-24). 
6 For an individual agent, expenditure can affect revenue by the expenditure reflux (Miura, 2015a; 
Miura, 2015b). However, based on the disposal irreversibility principle, expenditure affects only 
revenue of or after the second basic-term. In the framework of this paper, these revenue are not 
included in the budget, thus the expenditure reflux does not have an effect on individual decision-
making. 
7 This reason seems not to be applicable to saving based on asceticism morality. 
8 Also note that Point C satisfies the whole budget constraint. This constraint is derived from the 
individual constraint and the law of transfer equality. Therefore, satisfying these two conditions is a 
sufficient condition for satisfying the whole constraint. Accordingly, Point C, which fulfills the two 
conditions, automatically satisfies the whole constraint. 
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